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Abstract
In the course of history, a large number of politicians have been assassinated. Rational
choice hypotheses are developed and tested using panel data covering more than 100
countries over a period of 20 years. Several strategies, in addition to security measures, are
shown to significantly reduce the probability of politicians being attacked or killed: extended
institutional and governance quality, democracy, voice and accountability, a well functioning
system of law and order, decentralization via the division of power and federalism, larger
cabinet size and strengthened civil society. There is also support for a contagion effect.
JEL-Classification: D01, D70, K14, K42, Z10.
Keywords: Assassinations, rational choice, governance, democracy, dictatorship, deterrence,
protection.
2I. INTRODUCTION
On 22 November 1963, news of President John F. Kennedy’s assassination shocked the
whole world, leaving a lasting imprint on the collective psyche (Zelizer 1992). The murder of
politicians and other noted persons has been an important historical topic in our society.
Classic writers, such as Shakespeare or Schiller, have dedicated important works to this topic,
namely Macbeth and Wilhelm Tell respectively. Famous paintings depict the murder of rulers,
such as David’s “The Murdered Marat”. The assassination of rulers and other politicians has
been extensively treated in the historical literature (e.g., Hudson 2000, Demandt 2000,
Kellerhoff 2003, Uthmann 2004). There is also a substantial literature on the assassination of
specific politicians (e.g. Woolf 2006 on Caesar, Warren et al. 1964 on John F. Kennedy, or
Bondeson 2005 on Olof Palme). It is, of course, a central issue in criminology (e.g. Siegel
2005, 2007, Adler, Mueller and Laufer 2006, Schmalleger 2004). As for the social sciences,
the issue has received some limited attention in sociology (e.g. Wilkinson 1976) and political
science (e.g. Feierabend, Feierabend, Nesvold and Jaggar 1971, Laucella 1999, Barkan 2005,
and most importantly Iqbal and Zorn 2006, 2008). There is also a specialized “assassination
science” (e.g. Fetzer 2000). However, there are only a few studies in economics dealing
directly with political assassinations. The most important contributions are by Jones and
Olken (2008), analyzing econometrically the consequences of assassinations on institutions
and war, and by Zussman and Zussman (2006) on the effectiveness of counterterrorism
policy on the stock market (see also Crettez and Deloche 2007, and the more general studies
by Frey 2007a,b). The work done in the economics of crime (e.g. Becker 1968, 1974) and
terrorism (e.g., Enders and Sandler 2006, Frey 2004) is also directly relevant. This paper
theoretically develops and empirically tests a broad set of hypotheses to test the determinants
of actual and attempted assassinations using a large panel data set, covering a period of 20
years and more than 100 countries. The theoretical approach is developed using a rational
choice framework, working with an extended economics of crime model (see Section II).
Section III introduces the data and econometric model, Section IV presents the empirical
results, and Section V concludes.
II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
Political assassinations are a common feature of history (Jones and Olken 2008). Politicians
are killed under many different circumstances and for many reasons, for example by political
enemies seeking revenge. In 1961, the assassination of the first president of the Republic of
3Congo, Patrice Lumumba, was arranged by his contender Mobutu and, in 2006, the Shiite-
Kurdish government ordered the death of the former Sunnite dictator of Iraq, Saddam
Hussein. There are also so-called “targeted killings” arranged by other nations (see e.g.
Zussman and Zussman 2006, Statman 2004). There are still a significant number of political
assassinations, even if the number recorded is restricted to politicians in power (such as
kings, presidents or prime ministers)1, to successful attempts2, and to those undertaken by one
or a few persons3. Famous instances4 in classical European antiquity are the assassinations of
the Athenian ruler Hipparxos (514 BC), the father of Alexander the Great Phillip II of
Macedonia (336 BC), Cajus Julius Caesar (44 BC), and a large number of Roman Emperors5.
Political assassinations seldom occurred in Medieval Europe (though the French Kings Henry
III and Henry IV were killed in 1589 and 1610, respectively). More recent times saw many
such murders. Four American presidents have been assassinated (Abraham Lincoln 1865,
James A. Garfield 1881, William McKinley 1901, and John F. Kennedy 1963). In Russia, the
four emperors Ivan VI, Peter III, Paul I and Alexander II were murdered during a period of
less than 200 years. The post-war period of the 20th century has also seen a large number of
political assassinations, attracting massive media attention. In addition to John F. Kennedy in
1963, other notable political assassinations include the Spanish Prime Minister (PM) Luis
Carrero Blanco in 1973, the Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat in 1981, the Indian PM Indira
Gandhi in 1984, the Swedish PM Olof Palme in 1986, and the Serbian PM Zoran Djindjic in
2003.
2.1 A Simple Model of Political Assassinations
                                                 
1 This does not include several recent and significant assassinations, such as Robert Kennedy (1968), Martin
Luther King (1968), Aldo Moro (1978),Rajiv Gandhi (1999), Piet Fortuyn (2002) or Benazir Bhutto (2007).
2 There have been many thwarted attempts. Counting only significant assassination attempts, there are, for
example, the cases of American presidents Andrew Jackson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Gerald
Ford and Ronald Reagan. Napoleon III was the object of three assassination attempts within three years (twice
in 1855, and again in 1858).
3 The Latin word “attentatum” (i.e. attempted crime), which still exists today in several languages (e.g. in French
“attentat”, in Italian “attentato”, in Spanish “Attentado” or in German “Attentat”), but is not used in English,
captures this aspect. Another term sometimes used is “tyrannicide”, meaning the killing of a tyrant. The word
assassination refers to the Ismaili Muslim sect Hashshahin, or Assassins who, between the 8th and 14th centuries,
terrorized the Abbasid elite by fearlessly executing the politically motivated murders of rulers.
4 Facts on political assassinations have been taken from various sources (especially Iqbal and Zorn 2006, 2008,
and Jones and Olken 2008). Various articles in wikipedia on “Assassination”, “List of assassins”, “List of
unsuccessful assassinations”, “List of assassinated people”, “List of people who survived assassination
attempts”, “List of assassinations by car bombing”, “List of assassinated anticolonialist leaders” were also
useful; the information reported was checked.
5 just to name a few: Caligula (41AD), Claudius (54), Vitellius (69), Galba (69), Domitian (96), Commodus
(192), Didius Julianus (193), Geta (212), Caracalla (217), Elagabal (222), Maximinus Thrax (238), Pupenius
(238), Balbinus (238), Volasianus (253), and Galeus (253).
4In Schumpeter (1942) and Downs’ (1957) model of a perfectly competitive democracy, the
two parties offer the same program. If one party leaves office, the contending party pursues
the same program in the median of citizens’ preference distribution. Hence, there is no
incentive to kill a party leader, as this would not change policy. Assassinations of politicians
in power would not be necessary and politicians would not need to be protected against
would-be assassins. However, the previous sub-section has shown that such an approach
cannot explain the large number of political assassinations. It is therefore useful to reconsider
a theoretical framework that helps to deal with the determinants of assassinations. The simple
model we suggest has its foundation in the economic theory of crime, initially developed by
Becker (1968, 1974), which has since been extended and empirically tested on several
occasions (see e.g., Alper and Hellman 2006, Cameron 1988), and has been applied to
political assassinations (Frey 2007b). Similar approaches have also been used to model
rational extremism (Wintrobe 2006). Our model is summarized in Figure 1. There are four
possible outcomes:
1) The assassination is successful and the assassin is caught (outcome 1)
2) The assassination is successful but the assassin is not caught (outcome 2)
3) The assassination is not successful but the assassin is caught (outcome 3)
4) The assassination is not successful and the assassin is not caught (outcome 4).
We assume an additive Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. The utility U of a potential
assassin (PA) is decomposable as U(assassin) = )(
1
i
n
i
i xfp∑
=
, where f: X ℜ→  is a utility
function that represents preferences about the outcome (assassination) and p is the subjective
probability that the PA commits the event (assassination). Thus, there is a certain subjective
probability p that the PA is successful and a probability (1-p) that the PA fails in assassinating
the politician. We also assume that the PA is risk neutral. If the politician is assassinated, the
PA achieves a gain G or satisfaction S out of the assassination. In our case, the PA’s utility
function can be defined as U(S). In a status quo situation, his or her utility function would be
U(S0), where we assume that dU/dS0 >0. A successful killing would generate a new
satisfaction level S1=S0 + G, due to the satisfaction gain of G which increases his or her
utility function U(S0 + G). However, this is also connected to a certain effort level E. We
5assume that effort is costly and decreases the utility function of an assassin6. Thus, the PA’s
utility function would be U(S0 + G –E). However, there is not only a probability of success
but also a probability c that the PA is caught, convicted and sanctioned or not caught (1-c). If
the PA is caught, he or she will experience the cost of a sanction F that decreases his or her
utility level (dU/dF<0). Thus, the PA will attempt a political assassination if:
pcU(S0 + G –E –F)  + p(1-c)(U(S0 + G –E)  + (1-p) cU(S0 + E –F)
+ (1-p) (1-c)U(S0 + E) > U(S0) (1)
Figure 1: Model of Assassination
However, one can argue that a PA has alternative channels to express his or her level of
dissatisfaction with politicians in power or the government. Achieving political change is a
major incentive to kill political decision makers who pursue a disliked or hated policy.
Friedrich Schiller’s drama Wilhelm Tell deals with a classical instance of this desire, as do
many other dramatic works. Having a “voice” in democratic (election) processes, protests or
                                                 
6 We therefore assume that assassination efforts do not generate procedural utility.
Assassin (A)
Status quo
Ideology/Satisfaction
U(S0)
Attempted Assassination
(Effort: E)
  Success:                                                                                    Failure:
pU(S0 + G –E)                                                                      (1-p)U(S0 –E)
            p                                 (1-p)
            c                         (1-c)                                                                                          c                         (1-c)
Outcome 1 Outcome 2 Outcome 3 Outcome 4
pcU(S0 + G –E –F)         p(1-c)(U(S0 + G –E)                                   (1-p) cU(S0 + E –F)        (1-p) (1-c)U(S0 + E)
6strikes may help to influence political outcomes. Thus, we can extend equation (1) with a
factor that measures the gains from using moderate methods of legal pressure GL that require
effort EL. This means that the PA decides to carry out an assassination if:
pcU(S0 + G –E –F)  + p(1-c)(U(S0 + G –E)  + (1-p) cU(S0 + E –F)
+ (1-p) (1-c)U(S0 + E) > U(S0 + GL-EL) (2)
This equation shows how the decision to assassinate a politician can be modeled as a rational
choice. Certainly, further extensions and modifications are possible. For example, one could
argue that the probability of getting caught depends on the success of the political
assassination attempt. A higher success rate may require a higher level of risk taking, which
may lead to a higher probability of getting caught. Nevertheless, this simple model allows us
to develop several predictions, using a comparative static approach.
 2.2 Testable Propositions
The following aspects are expected to determine the level of actual and attempted
assassinations:
a. Catching Potential Attackers PA (c)
There are many different countermeasures to deter political assassinations. The more that is
spent on police, court personnel, and specialized equipment, the easier it is to discover
offenses and convict offenders. The more developed the state of detection technologies, the
easier it is to achieve a higher level of success (Becker 1968).
An efficient deterrence process is also generated by a better legal system. We
therefore introduce a law and order variable that assesses the strength and impartiality of the
legal system and the popular observance of the law. This leads us to the first hypothesis:
H1: An increase in the efforts to apprehend and convict assassins reduces the probability
of (attempted) assassinations.
One can argue that assassinations are contagious (Iqbal and Zorn 2006). The criminal
literature has stressed that the prevalence of a given type of criminal behavior may change the
propensity of others to engage in that same behavior. It affects the perceptions about the net
7return of such behavior (information function) and also the probability of arrests or
constraints (Ludwig and Kling 2006, Cook and Goss 1996, Becker and Murphy 2000, Manski
1993, 2000). A higher number of previous assassinations are an indicator that the government
is not able to cope efficiently with assassins.
H2: The current number of (attempted) assassinations depends positively on the number of
previous (attempted) assassinations.
b. The probability of a successful assassination (p) and/or the required effort to assassinate a
ruler (E)
The better a politician is protected against would-be killers, the larger are the costs for the
attacker. In history, there are prominent examples of organizations established to protect
politicians7. One of the earliest and best known is the Praetorian Guard (“Praetoriani”) used
by the Roman emperors. It dates back at least to the Scipio family and existed until 275 AD,
when it was dissolved by Constantine I. The size of this guard varied over time. Under the
first emperor Augustus, it was quite large, consisting of 9 cohorts of 500 to 1,000 men each.
After Augustus, the Praetorians started to meddle in political affairs. Instead of protecting
emperors, they often killed them, examples being Claudius (54 AD), Galba (69), Vitellius
(69), Pertinax (193), Caracalla (217), or Elagabalus (222).
The Janissaries formed the Ottoman sultan’s household troops and bodyguard. It
originated in the 14th century and was abolished four hundred years later (1826) by Sultan
Mahmud II. Its full strength varied widely. In 1475, for example, it numbered 6,000 men, and
in the 18th century it numbered 113,000 men (Nicolle 1995). As was the case with the
Praetorians, the Janissaries meddled heavily in politics and also killed rulers they were
supposed to protect. Thus, they assassinated Sultan Osman II in 1622.
The Garde Impériale was established in 1799 to protect the French consuls, but gained
prominence under Emperor Napoléon. It consisted of the most prominent Old Guard, the
Middle Guard and the Young Guard. In 1804, it numbered 8,000 men, but with the invasion
of Russia in 1812 it comprised more than 100,000 men. Their final defeat was at Waterloo,
where they retreated despite their motto “La Garde meurt mais se ne rend pas”.
                                                 
7 See e.g. Melanson and Stevens (2005), Beyer (2003), DiJulius (2003). The following articles in wikipedia
proved helpful in gaining an overview: “Bodyguard”, “Praetorian Guard”, “Janissary”, “Imperial Guard”,
”United States Secret Service”, “Royalty and Diplomatic Protection Department”.
8Hitler’s bodyguard considered themselves the 20th century equivalent of the
Praetorians (but were loyal to the Führer until the very end of WWII). The Schutzstaffel SS
(Höhne 1979, Graber 1982) was established in 1920 as a personal guard for Hitler, but was
initially part of the Schutzabteilung SA. With the execution of SA leadership in June 1934
(“Night of the Long Knives”), it became independent. Until 1929, it numbered no more than
280 personnel, but under the leadership of Heinrich Himmler it grew to 52,000 men in 1932,
to 250,000 men by the beginning of the War, and comprised 38 divisions during the War.
Hitler’s personal security (see Hoffmann 1980) was, of course, a smaller unit. In 1934, it was
the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH), but when this unit engaged as part of the
Waffen-SS in the War, Hitler’s personal security was entrusted to the Reichssicherheitsdienst
RSD.
Today’s most prominent bodyguard is found in the United States. It has been designed
to protect the president and comprises 2,100 plainclothes special agents (usually in
conservative business suits, sunglasses and communication earpieces), a uniformed division
of 1,200 persons and 1,700 technical and administrative employees8. The corresponding unit
in the United Kingdom is called Royalty and Diplomatic Protection Department, and in
Russia it is the Federal Protective Service (Deriabin 1984, Deriabin and Bagley 1990). The
latter is estimated to number more than 30,000 uniformed personnel plus several thousand
plainclothes agents. The Presidential Security Service protects the president of Russia.
However, bodyguards can sometimes be disloyal. A famous case is the assassination of the
Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984 by two of her Sikh bodyguards (Frank 2002,
Sarin 1990, Dilip and Ashok 1985).
The preceding discussion on the various bodyguards highlights the impossibility of
getting any clear quantitative notion of their size. This is not only due to the fact that much of
the work they do is highly secret, but also that they perform many different tasks in addition
to protecting the ruling politician. A common feature, however, is that the bodyguard has a
strong tendency to grow in leaps and bounds, and that the strict task of protecting the ruler is
transferred to a smaller specialized unit. Their growth does not necessarily mean that the ruler
is better protected, because their large number and importance give them the opportunity  to
meddle in politics, and even to seize power.
                                                 
8 The American Secret Service also investigates a wide variety of financial fraud crimes and identity thefts and
provides forensic assistance for some local crimes. Not all of the 5,000 Secret Service agents are directly
involved with protecting the president.
9There are many different possibilities to raise the costs of attacking a politician. The
most important ones are: clearing large areas (for instance, shutting down entire sections of
cities and roads and restricting access to buildings); using armored cars (of which the best
known is the “Popemobile” with its bulletproof glass); using bomb and weapon detectors;
wearing bullet proof vests; having a body double as a decoy; or going into seclusion. These
counter-measures offer varying degrees of effectiveness, depending on the circumstances,
and impose different costs on the person requiring protection. They all serve to make an
attack more difficult, raising the cost of attempting to assassinate a politician. We therefore
empirically test the following hypothesis:
H3: An increase in protection reduces the number of (attempted) assassinations.
However, some would-be killers are attracted by prominent politicians and have an
inner drive to kill them, irrespective of how these politicians act and irrespective of the
response from the media9. One example is John Hinckley, who severely wounded President
Ronald Reagan. Hinckley was subsequently described as having serious psychological
problems. He stated publicly that he had wanted to get the attention of actress Jody Foster
rather than make any political or ideological statement10. These cases can be considered to be
(high level) random events. However, such random events are more frequently observed in
larger societies.
H4: The larger the population of a country, the higher is the chance that a mentally
deranged person attacks and kills a politician.
c. Political Accountability (G)
Assassinations of political rulers are undertaken for many different reasons, ranging from
political and ideological differences, wanting to attract media attention to the work of
                                                 
9 There is a considerable psychological and medical literature devoted to these cases. For example, Fine and
Vossekuil (1999) estimated that about 25% of the actual attackers in the United States were found to be
delusional, a figure that rose to 60% with 'near-lethal approachers'. They also estimated that around two-thirds
had previously been arrested for (not necessarily related) offenses, that around 44% had a history of serious
depression, and 39% a history of substance abuse. These studies appear to attribute a large part of all political
assassinations to mentally deranged persons. See the critical discussion in Iqbal and Zorn (2006).
10 Prominent people always run the risk of being attacked on these grounds. Examples are the Beatle John
Lennon in 1980, or the film director, writer and art critic Theo van Gogh in 2004. Tennis player Monica Seles is
an example of an unsuccessful assassination attempt. In 1993, while playing in Hamburg, a Steffi Graf fan
stabbed her.
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mentally deranged persons. While leaders of democratic countries are also targets, there
seems to be a clear prevalence in dictatorial and authoritarian countries. For example,
between 1921 and 1945, there were about 40 assassination attempts on Hitler11, the most
notable ones being by Kurt Lutter in 1933, by Johannes Georg Elser in 1933, by Erwin von
Witzleben in 1941, by Henning von Treskow in 1943 and by Claus Schenk Graf von
Stauffenberg in 1944. This highlights a central hypothesis of the paper: The more politically
accountable a country is, the less political assassinations are attempted. The more accountable
and democratic the governance is, the lower is the incentives to seek a policy change by
exerting force. Interestingly, in Switzerland (a country with a high level of direct democracy
and local autonomy), the Swiss politicians, including the members of the Bundesrat (the
Federal Council), are not normally protected and take pride in using public transportation just
as everyone else. Indeed, no member of the Federal Council has ever been killed for political
reasons12.
Conversely, there is a strong desire to kill rulers and politicians who impose their own
will on the population. The less accountable a ruler is, i.e. the more he or she pursues his or
her own will and disregards the will of the population, and oppresses the people, the greater is
the benefit killing him or her. In contrast, in a politically accountable state, this incentive is
weak, because policies are more likely to take into account the preferences of the population.
Moreover, the rulers are sanctioned by an elected parliament that is perceived as efficient, or
in some cases even by popular vote. We can therefore develop the following hypothesis:
H5: An increase in political accountability, government effectiveness and constitutional
strength, and therefore an increase in the legitimacy of the ruler(s), reduces the
number and the probability of (attempted) assassinations. The stronger the civil
society, the less politicians are killed.
d. Expected gains (G) of killing a ruler
The expected effect on policy of an assassination (see also Jones and Olken 2008) is greater
when there is one politician in charge than if the policy is determined by a committee of
(equal) politicians. This one person in charge, (it may be a king, a president or a prime
                                                 
11 Duffy and Ricci (1992), Hamerow (1997), Gisevius (1998).
12 There have been political assassinations in Switzerland, but the targets have been foreigners visiting or
seeking refuge in the country, and the attackers have also been foreigners. Examples are the Austrian Empress
and Queen of Hungary Elisabeth (“Sisi” or “Sissi” in books and films), who was killed in 1898 by an anarchist
in Lausanne, and Kazem Rajavi, an Iranian opposition leader, who was assassinated in 1990 in Geneva.
11
minister), plays a prominent role and has some discretionary room to act according to his or
her preferences. He or she, therefore, becomes the object of dislike or hatred for a number of
individuals, some of whom may demand that the ruler be killed. On the other hand, if the
government has many cabinet ministers, an extreme policy is more difficult to pursue and
various different interests are accommodated.
Individuals may have an incentive to kill a politician to create chaos, independent of
whether the ruling politician pursues the will of the people. This was the avowed goal of
some revolutionaries of the 1960s13. However, the probability that a political assassination
leads to chaos is smaller in a democracy than in a more authoritarian system, because the
succession rules are clearly determined. Therefore, the desire to kill politicians depends on
factors similar to those involved when an attacker directly seeks a change of policy. We
therefore test the following hypothesis empirically by using the cabinet size as a proxy for the
number of politicians in charge.
H6: An increase in the number of politicians in charge leads to a decrease in the number
of (attempted) assassinations.
In a centralized state, the ruler has more power than in a governmental system with several
decision makers. In a country with an extensive division of power between the legislature, the
executive and the judiciary, as well as between the central and sub-central units (states,
provinces, communes), there is less incentive to kill politicians because the advantages of
assassinating leading politicians is expected to be smaller.
H7: The more centralized a country is, the more assassinations are observed.
On the other hand, increasing the level of political instability/unrest or conflicts raises the
number and the probability of (attempted) political assassinations. An increase in the level of
aggressiveness makes it harder for the rulers to satisfy citizens’ preferences, which can lead
to an increase in (attempted) assassinations. Assassinations are fostered by the presence of
more generalized political unrest, and people may feel the need to engage in all kinds of
political violence, including assassinations (Iqbal and Zorn 2006).
                                                 
13 It is debatable whether they meet the conditions outlined above for a political assassination, as these
revolutionaries were often terrorist groups (such as the German RAF, the Italian Brigate Rosse, or the French
Action Direct) and not one or a few individual attackers (see e.g. Frey 2004).
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H8: An increase in the level of political instability and unrest (conflicts) raises the number
of (attempted) assassinations.
An increase in income inequality also reduces trust in the ruler(s). It is an indicator of a lower
level of solidarity by the elite toward lower income groups. Furthermore, income inequality
may be associated with political instability. On the one hand, less privileged groups may
choose to use undemocratic instruments to improve their situation (Alesina and Perotti 1996).
On the other hand, privileged groups may try to maintain their position by illegal means.
H9: A higher level of income inequality increases the number and the probability of
(attempted) assassinations.
The more developed the media, the more attention is focused on the ruler. An important part
of any dictator’s policy is to use the media to his or her advantage (see Glaeser 2006). Hitler
was one of the first to fully exploit this possibility (skillfully managed by Goebbels, see e.g.
Fest 1963, Kershaw 2000); contemporary dictatorships do the same, sometimes to a
ridiculous extent (as in the case of Saparmurat Niyazov, President of Turkmenistan 1985-
2006, or Kim Jong-il in North Korea). An aspect of the dictator’s personality cult is that
much attention is focused on his or her person, possibly making him or her the object of
aggression (e.g., Reiner 2002). On the other hand, an increase in freedom of the press can
reduce the probability of (attempted) political assassinations. Freedom of speech and freedom
of the press are generally considered to be important human rights and are powerful controls
against government malfeasance (Brunetti and Weder 2003), providing alternative ways of
achieving political changes or expressing political preferences. We focus on the lack of
freedom of the press by looking at repressive actions or facilities, censorship, self-censorship,
harassment and expulsions. Repression reduces the possibility of having a “voice”, which
reduces the possibilities and incentives of using legal pressure (GL) and increases the
incentives to gain from a political change (G).
H10: Reducing freedom of the press, in the form of media repression, increases the
incentive for political assassinations.
13
It may be argued that there are would-be assassins who want to attract the attention of the
media by killing a ruler; they are not interested in the political consequences. With a free
press, the attention gained is typically greater than with the media in an authoritarian system,
where the news may even be suppressed so that the political class can cling to power. A
recent example was the sudden death of the dictatorial ruler of Turkmenistan, Niyazov. It was
rumored that he was poisoned, but whether this is true or not remains unclear, as the media in
Turkmenistan are completely controlled. In contrast, in a country with free media, such
rumors cannot be suppressed, which raises the media attention obtained by a political
assassination. Thus, there may also be an imitation effect induced by intensive media
attention (Reiner 2002, Christensen 2004).
III. DATA AND ECONOMETRIC MODEL
1. Political Assassinations
A POLITICAL ASSASSINATION (PA) is defined as “any politically motivated murder or
attempted murder of a high government official or politician”. The Banks’ Cross-National
Time-Series Data Archive14 supplies the data, which covers a large set of countries over a
very long period of time. Tables A1 and A2 and Figure A1 provide an overview of the data
used. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the data is not bias-free. Many aspects of political
murders are either unknown or uncertain, or for political reasons remain undisclosed.
Moreover, in the case of political assassinations, the data are often not objective but are
systematically manipulated by the persons and organizations involved. This applies in
particular to thwarted assassination attempts. The security services often have an interest in
publicizing – or even in inventing – thwarted attempts in order to emphasize their
importance, and to thereby accrue more prestige, political importance and funds. Under
different circumstances, the security services may have an interest in suppressing the
publication of such events because they fear an imitation effect. Such manipulation is easier
in dictatorships and in countries with controlled media than in democratic countries. This
means that some of the data points are more unreliable than others. This creates a special
problem, because political assassinations seem to occur more often in authoritarian
developing economies than in democratic developed economies15.
                                                 
14 For simplicity’s sake, the term “political assassination” is taken to include both attempted and successful
political assassinations.
15 Such manipulation of data is a common phenomenon when the data are of importance in the political process.
For instance, misrepresentation has proved to be a problem for GNP and other economic indicators declared to
be goals of government activity. As the rate of unemployment has become a politically important indicator,
14
2. Independent Variables
We use the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) data set to measure political risk,
political accountability and law and order. The POLITICAL RISK INDEX (PRI) provides an
assessment of the political stability on a comparable basis by using 12 different measures that
cover both political and social factors. These measures include aspects such as bureaucratic
quality, corruption, democratic accountability, government stability, law and order, internal
and external conflicts, religious and ethnic tensions, or military presence in politics.16 A
higher number of points indicates a lower potential risk and therefore higher scores are in line
with a higher institutional and governance quality. We develop a further index, namely
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY (AC) that focuses on the five variables - bureaucratic
quality, corruption, democratic accountability, government stability and law and order. In
addition, LAW & ORDER (LO)17 is a key variable in our theoretical model (see previous
section). Further data are taken from the Banks’ Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive,
namely the cabinet size (CS), which refers to the number of ministers of cabinet rank and
several variables that allow us to construct a Conflict Index (CI)18 that covers general strikes,
guerrilla warfare, government crises, purges, riots, revolutions and anti-government
demonstrations. The remaining variables (CTRL) are collected from the World Development
Indicators and refer to population size, share of people age 65+, and GDP. To our
knowledge, no internationally comparable data on security expenditures and other efforts to
protect politicians are available. For the same reason that the number of assassination
attempts may be biased, the activities of the security organizations are not revealed. As a
(admittedly imperfect) proxy, we take defense expenditures as a percentage of total national
                                                                                                                                                        
governments have started to manipulate it in order to simulate a better picture of the state of the labor market
than is accurate. Thus, the long-term unemployed are defined as no longer being part of the work force and
therefore no longer raise the official rate of unemployment. It is also well known that the measure of budget
deficit has been cleverly manipulated by some European countries when the rules for entering the European
Monetary Union required that budget deficits did not exceed three percent of GDP and the public debt did not
exceed sixty percent of GDP (see, e.g., Forte 2001, Von Hagen and Wolff 2004). Such distortions of indicators
were so widespread that observers stated that “[...] the determining factor for achieving membership of the
planned European Monetary Union (EMU) seems to rely on widespread use of public-sector creative accounting
measures” (Dafflon and Rossi 1999: 59-60).
16 http://www.icrgonline.com/page.aspx?page=icrgmethods#Background_of_the_ICRG_Rating_System
17 The ‘law’ sub-component measures the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the ‘order’ sub-
component is an assessment of popular observance of the law.
18 We use the Weighted Conflict Index  provided by Banks’ Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive  without
considering political assassinations. The weighted conflict index is calculated in the following manner: multiply
the value of the number of General Strikes by 43, Guerrilla Warfare by 46, Government Crises by 48, Purges by
86, Riots by 102, Revolutions by 148, Anti-Government Demonstrations by 200. Add the weighted values
together and divide by 8 (see Banks’ Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive codebook).
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government expenditures (derived from the Banks’ Cross-National Time-Series Data
Archive), because it can arguably be assumed that they are strongly positively correlated - he
larger the share of military expenditures, the larger the expected protection given to
politicians. The GINI coefficient is used as a proxy for income inequality, using the World
Income Inequality Database. A proxy for decentralization and federalism is derived from the
DPI 2004 Database of Political Institutions. An index is constructed covering the following
variables: contiguous autonomous regions, locally elected municipal governments and
state/province governments19.
3. Specifications
To test our hypotheses, the following baseline equations are econometrically estimated:
PAit = α + β1 CTRLit +β2 PRIit +β3 CIit+ β4 CSit  + TDt +REGIONi + εit (3)
PAit = α + β1 CTRLit +β2 ACit +β3 CIit+ β4 CSit  + TDt +REGIONi + εit (4)
PAit = α + β1 CTRLit +β2 LOit +β3 CIit+ β4 CSit  + TDt +REGIONi + εit , (5)
where i indexes the countries in the sample and t denotes the time period (1984 till 2003). We
control for time as well as regional invariant factors including fixed time, TDt,  and fixed
regional effects, REGIONi20. εit  denotes the error term. Specification (5) can be extended to
include lagged political assassination data (LPA, see specification (6)). This allows us to
examine whether there is a contagion effect. Moreover, it provides a way to account for
historical factors, which are difficult to account for in other way, and therefore controls for
unobserved variables.
PAit = α + β1 CTRLit +β2 LOit +β3 CIit+ β4 CSit + β5LPAit +TDt +REGIONi + εit      (6)                 
In further specifications, the number of control variables can be extended to include GDP per
capita. It controls for wealth and economic development, which allows a polity that provides
more benefits to the people (Iqbal and Zorn 2006). In addition, we test alternative hypotheses,
focusing on further variables (FV), such as the impact of defense expenditures, federalism,
lack of freedom of the press and income inequality.
                                                 
19 Mean value of all the subfactors.
20 We differentiate between Europe, Latin America, North America, North Africa, Sub Saharan Africa, the
Pacific, Asia, the Caribbean and Australia.
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PAit = α + β1 CTRLit +β2 LOit +β3 CIit+ β4 CSit + β5LPAit + β6FVit +TDt
+REGIONi + εit                                                                                                              (7)
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 1 presents the basic results. We report three models, namely OLS specifications, probit
models where 1 measures whether a political assassination happened in i at time t (0
otherwise), and left censored tobit models due to a large amount of zeros in the data set. In
the OLS estimations, the beta or standardized regression coefficients compare magnitude,
which reveals the relative importance of the variables employed. To obtain robust standard
errors in these estimations, we use the Huber/White/Sandwich estimators of standard errors.
Table 1 indicates that the results are quite robust with regard to the chosen models. In the first
three specifications, we explore the effect of the POLITICAL RISK INDEX variable. The
coefficient is highly statistically significant. The probit specification (see regression (2))
indicates that an increase in the political risk index variable by one unit reduces the
probability of assassinations by 2.8 percentage points. In specifications (4) to (6), the variable
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY is used instead of POLITICAL RISK INDEX. The result
suggests that political or governance institutions are important. The coefficient is always
statistically significant, showing relatively large quantitative effects. The higher the level of
accountability and governance quality, the lower is the incentive to kill politicians, as the
preferences of the people are better taken into account in the political process. Thus, an
increase in political accountability, government effectiveness and constitutional strength, or,
in other words, an increase in the legitimacy of the ruler(s), reduces the number of political
assassinations. The stronger the civil society, the less politicians are killed (or survive
assassination attempts). In specifications (7) to (9), we use LAW AND ORDER instead of
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY or POLITICAL RISK INDEX. The results show that the
variable LAW AND ORDER has an even stronger negative impact on political
assassinations, as evidenced by the size of the coefficients, the marginal effects and the R2. In
last three specifications (10) to (12), the variable CONFLICT INDEX is omitted to check for
robustness, as it can be argued that the variable is endogenous. As can be seen, the previous
results remain robust. In particular, we observe that the variable LAW AND ORDER is still
statistically significant and indicates the strongest quantitative effects among all the
independent variables used.
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In sum, the findings indicate that hypotheses 1 (on the effort made to apprehend and
convict assassins) and 5 (on legitimacy and civil society) cannot be rejected. The CONFLICT
INDEX variable is also statistically significant at the 1% level in the 12 regressions, with the
largest beta coefficients. Thus, an increase in political instability, political unrest or conflicts
increases the number and the probability of (attempted) political assassinations quite
markedly, a result that supports hypothesis 8. This result is consistent with what Iqbal and
Zorn (2006) report.
Table 1 suggests that cabinet size is negatively correlated with political assassinations,
which is consistent with hypothesis 6. A large cabinet reduces the incentives to kill a
politician. However, compared to the other variables discussed, the effect is not very strong
and the coefficient is not always statistically significant in the three models. On the other
hand, the population size has a strong and statistically significant positive impact on
assassinations. Thus, hypothesis 4 cannot be rejected. Individuals compelled by some inner
drive, rather than by a political motive, to kill politicians, are more frequently observed in
larger subject pools. A larger share of people age 65+ has a negative impact on political
assassinations. The literature on the economics of crime also suggests that age is negatively
correlated with committing crimes21. The OLS estimates show a statistically significant
negative correlation. However, the impact is less obvious with the two alternative models.
In the next step, we explore whether we find a contagion effect and how economic
development affects political assassinations. The results are reported in Table 2. The lagged
assassination variable (ASSASSINATION(t-1)) is always statistically significant and shows
the largest beta coefficients of all the regressions reported in Table 2. Contrary to Iqbal and
Zorn (2006), we observe a strong contagion effect, which is consistent with hypothesis 2. The
previously observed results remain robust. Specifications (19) to (21) report a positive
relationship between economic development and political assassinations. However, the
coefficient is only statistically significant in the OLS regression. This suggests that developed
countries are not free from experiencing political assassinations once we control for
governance/institutional quality and the level of conflict22.
Table 3 tests the remaining hypotheses. For simplicity’s sake, we only report the
coefficients of the variables of interest. Table 3 provides a summary of 16 regressions. The
                                                 
21 For a discussion, see Torgler (2007) and Torgler and Valev (2006, 2007).
22 Nevertheless, one should keep in mind the previous discussion with regard to potential biases in our
dependent variable. Due to potential manipulation, data from developing countries are less reliable than those
from developed countries.
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findings show that hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected. An increase in defense expenditures in
relation to total national expenditures reduces the number of political assassinations. To the
extent that defense expenditures are indeed a reasonably good proxy for the unobtainable
expenditures and other efforts to protect politicians, the estimation results indeed show that
the better a politician is protected against would-be killers, the larger the costs to the attacker
and the lower the number of political assassinations. Comparable effects are observable when
focusing on how decentralization affects political assassinations. The coefficient is also
statistically significant in all the specifications showing similar beta coefficients. This result
is consistent with hypothesis 7. An increase in decentralization via the division of power and
federalism reduces the likelihood of politicians being attacked and killed.
The following regressions focus on the lack of freedom of the press. The findings
show a positive correlation with the number of assassinations. Repressive actions against the
media increase the incentive to take radical steps, such as political assassinations, to combat
the existing regime. Alternative channels of voice are suppressed and negative reciprocity
encouraged. The coefficient is statistically highly significant and the beta coefficients report
large quantitative effects. Finally, Table 3 reports how changes in income inequality are
related to political assassinations. There is a strong positive correlation that is statistically
significant at the 1% percent level in all the regressions. Thus, hypothesis 9 cannot be
rejected. When income is distributed more unequally, the support for the regime in power
falls and the incentive to use radical and undemocratic instruments to change the situation
increases.
Table 4 explores the robustness of the previous findings by applying an instrumental
variable technique approach. Evaluating the direct effects of our governance quality or law
and order and conflicts variable on political assassinations, in a setting where unobserved
factors may affect these two key independent variables and political assassinations, may
require an instrumental variable technique to separate the impact of these factors from
underlying alternative factors. It can be argued that a higher level of political assassinations
may lead to more conflicts. However, most of the variables included in our index, such as
general strikes, anti-government demonstrations, revolutions, or riots can be seen as activities
organized by non-elite groups rather than reactions to the existing regime due to political
assassinations. Jones and Olken (2008) explore whether assassinations affect military
conflicts. They find that assassinations only have a limited affect on conflict. Successful
assassinations lead to an intensification of small-scale conflicts. On the other hand, weaker
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evidence was found for high-intensity conflicts. Successful assassinations seemed to have the
opposite effect, promoting the end of the conflict. This may reduce the causality problem.
Nevertheless, political assassinations may weaken the current elite, which may lead to a
stronger incentive to induce a change in power through such channels as inciting revolutions.
For these reasons, it is important to analyze potential causality problems. Table 4 reports four
2SLS estimations, together with several diagnostic tests and the first stage regressions. It
should be noted that the results remain robust using the variables P O L I T I C A L
ACCOUNTABILITY or POLITICAL RISK INDEX, instead of LAW AND ORDER, and
using the alternative specifications discussed in previous tables. Table 4 indicates that, for the
2SLS, the coefficient of our instrumented variables remains statistically significant. Similar
results are also visible for other independent variables, such as population or cabinet size.
First, we use a lagged law and order variable (LAW AND ORDER(t-1)) as a straightforward
instrument for LAW AND ORDER (see regressions (22) and (24)). In the next step, another
instrument for LAW AND ORDER is added, namely temperature (see regressions (23) and
(25)). In the first two regressions in Table 4, the variable CONFLICT INDEX is omitted.
Once we include the variable CONFLICT INDEX, we also include a one-year lagged conflict
index variable (CONFLICT INDEX(t-1)) as an instrument for it. The use of temperature as
an instrument requires further discussion. There are an increasing number of studies that
investigate the way in which climatic conditions have an impact on countries’ or regions’
institutions (see, e.g., Engerman and Sokoloff 1997, Landes 1998, La Porta et al. 1999,
Diamond 1997, Sachs 2000, Hirshleifer and Shumway 2003, Schaltegger and Torgler 2007).
Such external situations may affect the preferences of inhabitants and hence their culture and
institutional arrangements. According to Diamond (1997), geography and climate help to
explain different nations’ economic destinies. La Porta et al. (1999) investigate the effect of
latitude and argue (in line with Landes (1998)) that temperate zones result in better
agriculture and a healthier climate, which helps to develop their economies and institutions.
However, Sachs (2000) criticizes this approach, arguing “when latitude is tested for
explanatory power against various direct climate or ecological measures, we find that latitude
per se adds little if anything to the explanation of patterns of cross-country development” (pp.
4-5). The studies of Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), Landes (1998) and Sachs (2000)
investigate the connection between climate and economic development. Sachs (2000), for
example, presents evidence that production technology in the tropics has lagged behind
temperate zone technology in the areas of agriculture and health, which opened a
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considerable income gap between the climate zones. Roll (1992) emphasizes that the
unambiguously observable weather is a genuinely exogenous identifying variable.
Schaltegger and Torgler (2007), show that weather conditions are valid instruments for
government accountability. The advantage of using temperature is that it varies over time to a
certain degree, and can therefore be considered in a panel analysis. Thus, we investigate the
relevance of a nation’s annual mean TEMPERATURE in Celsius23 as an instrument for LAW
AND ORDER, POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY and POLITICAL RISK INDEX. Table 4
shows that the instruments employed are effective in explaining LAW AND ORDER and
CONFLICT INDEX. All factors are statistically significant at the 5% or 1% level. Moreover,
the F-tests for the instrument exclusion set in the first-stage regression are statistically
significant at the 1% level in all cases. Table 4 also reports a test for instrument relevance,
using the Anderson canonical correlations LR to analyze whether the equation can be
identified. The test shows that the null hypothesis can be rejected, indicating that the model is
identified and the instruments are relevant (see Hall, Rudebusch and Wilcox 1996).  The
Anderson-Rubin test suggests that the endogenous variables are jointly statistically
significant. Such a test is robust to the presence of weak instruments. We also present
Sargan’s (1958) test for over-identification of the specifications (23) and (25), where we use
two instruments for LAW AND ORDER to examine the validity of the exclusion restrictions.
The test results indicate that the Sargan tests fail to reject the null hypotheses that our
instruments are valid. These outcomes support the validity of the instruments employed in the
analysis. In sum, the empirical results provided in Table 4 are in line with the results from
previous tables, suggesting that the econometric estimation results are consistent with our key
hypotheses.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In the course of history, many politicians have been assassinated. Even if we only count the
murder of rulers, such as presidents, prime ministers, and kings and queens, there are still
many cases of political murders. These have happened primarily in authoritarian or dictatorial
countries, but leaders in democracies, for instance, have also been targeted, as shown by the
many successful assassinations and attempted assassinations of American presidents. A
                                                 
23 See Mitchell et al. (2004).
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rational choice analysis is developed to explain the determinants of political assassinations
and several hypotheses are tested.
The results allow us to draw policy conclusions that go beyond the deterrence approach
presently dominating the policy agenda. Our analysis suggests that an extension of voice and
accountability, governance quality and rule of law, a larger cabinet, more decentralization via
the division of power and federalism, an increase in freedom of the press, a decrease in
income inequality, a strengthening of civil society and an increase in protection significantly
reduce the incentive to assassinate politicians. The empirical analysis suggests that alternative
instruments, going beyond deterrence, should be considered to reduce the number of
(attempted) political assassinations. The policies presently undertaken are dominated by a
deterrence approach, where the costs to the attacker are raised. This is true even for
democracies where increasing emphasis has been put on protecting politicians by using the
secret service, police or military forces. Thus, for example, the security precautions taken to
protect the American president are enormous, both at home and when he visits foreign
countries24. It has become common practice in democratic countries to seal off whole streets
and sections of cities to protect local and foreign politicians. The protective measures are
even more extensive in authoritarian and dictatorial countries25. However, the costs of these
measures are external to these organizations and persons, and are moreover a public bad, so
that only little, if any, opposition is mustered. The closing off of streets and sections of cities,
for example, is costly for the people in terms of inconvenience and time lost. For the secret
service, the costs imposed are irrelevant as long as the persons negatively affected have no
incentive to oppose them at an individual level. A political movement restricting these
measures can easily be thwarted, as the benefits of the security measures are clear.
Quite a different approach to using deterrence is to reduce the expected benefits for
assailants. As suggested in our paper, there are a variety of options. A move to a more
democratic and accountable regime, a regime with a higher level of governance and
institutional quality, with a better functioning law and order system and more decentralized
                                                 
24 When the US president visits a foreign country, a large number of secret service agents are sent in advance.
When the president arrives, he does so with a small air force, a motorcade of armor-plated cars, a
communications van packed with state-of-the art devices and 250 heavily-armed secret service agents, dozens of
advisers and teams of sniffer dogs. See “Protecting the US president abroad”
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/amewricas/4535911.stm).
25 The current emphasis on protective measures can partly be explained by rent seeking (the same can be
claimed for the reaction against terrorist threats, treated extensively in Frey 2004, chapter 2). There are a great
many organizations and persons benefiting directly from extended security measures, in particular the secret
service community.
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structures that are less vulnerable to attacks, may reduce the number of (attempted) political
assassinations. The decentralization of power can be enhanced by dividing it more equally
between parliament and the courts, and by granting more power to the subunits (states,
provinces, communes). Policies to reduce income inequality and to promote freedom of the
press also tend to reduce the number of political assassinations. In addition, changing from
one (democratic) ruler (be it president, prime minister or king) to a committee of several
persons also reduces the incentive of assassins to attack executive members. For example, the
danger of political assassinations would drastically fall if the US executive were to consist of
a committee of equals, say of three to seven persons. The incentive to kill any of them would
be much smaller, as any would-be assassin realizes that killing one of them would hardly
affect the policy direction.
We also observe that assassinations are contagious. This result is consistent with the
criminal literature, which has stressed that the prevalence of a given type of criminal behavior
may affect the propensity of others to engage in criminal behavior.
The paper constitutes an empirical step towards deepening the analysis of political
assassinations using a large panel data set. We are well aware that an econometric analysis is
only one approach to gaining insights into the reasons for political assassinations. Future
work could profit from case studies of political assassinations, especially if it were based on
the technique of “analytic narratives” (see, e.g., Bates et al. 1998) to generate further
theoretical and empirical insights for at least some aspects of the issues involved.
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Table 1: The Determinants of Political Assassinations (1984-2003)
Explanatory
variables
OLS Probit Tobit (left
censored)
OLS Probit Tobit (left
censored)
OLS Probit Tobit (left
censored)
OLS Probit Tobit (left
censored)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
-0.112*** -0.028*** -0.100***
(-4.28) (-7.87) (-7.56)
Political Risk
Index
-0.004
Political
Accountability
-0.069*** -0.243*** -0.893***
(-2.69) (-5.22) (-5.09)
-0.034
Law and Order -0.161*** -0.309*** -1.126*** -0.198*** -0.340*** -1.273***
(-5.96) (-8.02) (-8.12) (-6.97) (-8.97) (-8.96)
-0.041 -0.046
Conflict Index 0.179*** 0.3e-04*** 0.0001*** 0.185*** 0.3e-04*** 0.1e-03*** 0.172*** 0.3e-04*** 0.1e-03***
(4.26) (4.78) (6.28) (4.40) (5.06) (6.85) (4.19) (4.84) (6.28)
0.4e-05 0.4e-05 0.4e-05
Cabinet Size -0.056*** -0.005*** -0.026 -0.052*** -0.003 -0.019 -0.056*** -0.003 -0.019 -0.073*** -0.007 -0.038*
(-3.40) (-0.82) (-1.22) (-3.17) -0.49 -0.91 (-3.38) (-0.47) (-0.91) (-3.96) -1.29 (-1.76)
-0.001 -0.4e-03 -0.3e-03 -0.001
log(population) 0.115*** 0.200*** 0.739*** 0.119*** 0.194*** 0.726*** 0.113*** 0.195*** 0.702*** 0.172*** 0.248*** 0.932***
(5.43) (6.71) (6.66) (5.56) (6.53) (6.56) (5.53) (6.54) (6.49) (7.40) (8.83) (8.63)
0.026 0.027 0.026 0.033
Share Population -0.096*** 0.005 0.008 -0.109*** -0.009 -0.039 -0.088*** 0.006 0.020 -0.095*** 0.003 0.006
>65 (-3.42) (0.26) (0.12) (-3.78) -0.47 -0.56 (-3.33) (0.31) (0.29) (-3.49) 0.16 0.08
0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.4e-03
Regional fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2/ Pseudo R2 0.144 0.213 0.157 0.140 0.191 0.143 0.150 0.216 0.161 0.126 0.196 0.147
Prob > F/ Prob >
chi2
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
# of observations 2464 2386 2464 2483 2405 2483 2483 2405 2483 2484 2406 2484
Notes: Estimations with robust standard errors. OLS coefficients = standardized/beta coefficients. t-statistics in parentheses, marginal effects in italics. *, ** and *** denote significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The probit regressions have a lower amount of observations, as one region has no variation.
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Table 2: Contagion Effect
Explanatory variables OLS Probit Tobit (left
censored)
OLS Probit Tobit (left
censored)
OLS Probit Tobit (left
censored)
 (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21)
0.201** 0.130*** 0.449*** 0.195*** 0.130*** 0.428*** 0.187** 0.13*** 0.416***
(2.58) (3.35) (4.79) (2.60) (3.54) (4.66) (2.58) (3.55) (4.50)
Assassinations(t-1)
0.017 0.017 0.018
Law and Order -0.189*** -0.318*** -1.223*** -0.157*** -0.290*** -1.087*** -0.227*** -0.317*** -1.200***
(-5.68) (-7.13) (-7.42) (-4.94) (-6.36) (-6.76) (-5.18) (-5.89) (-6.78)
-0.042 -0.037 -0.044
Conflict Index 0.163*** 0.3e-04*** 0.0001*** 0.164*** 0.3e-04*** 0.0001***
(3.81) (5.11) (5.52) (3.65) (4.77) (5.23)
3.9e-06 4e-06
Cabinet Size -0.060*** -0.01 -0.037 -0.046*** -0.002 -0.020 -0.046** 0.0009 -0.009
(-3.45) (-1.08) -1.46 (-2.87) (-0.40) (-0.80) (-2.55) (0.13) (-0.34)
-0.001 -0.0003 0.0001
log(population) 0.152*** 0.24**** 0.896*** 0.100*** 0.194*** 0.681*** 0.126*** 0.195*** 0.690***
(6.54) (7.49) (7.21) (4.85) (5.69) (5.51) (5.17) (5.46) (5.44)
0.032 0.025 0.027
Share Population >65 -0.048* 0.009 0.034 -0.046* 0.012 0.047 -0.110*** 0.007 0.005
(-1.95) (0.40) (0.43) (-1.92) (0.52) (0.60) (-3.42) (0.29) (0.05)
0.001 0.002 0.001
log(GDP per capita) 0.130*** 0.045 0.243
(3.47) (0.77) (1.16)
        0.006  
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2/ Pseudo R2 0.170 0.223 0.164 0.192 0.245 0.179 0.200 0.243 0.177
Prob > F/ Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
# of observations 1810 1755 1810 1809 1754 1809 1684 1629 1684
Notes: Estimations with robust standard errors. OLS coefficients = standardized/beta coefficients. t-statistics in parentheses, marginal effects in italics. *, **
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The probit regressions have a lower amount of observations, as one region has no
variation.
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Table3: Defense Expenditures, Federalism, Press Freedom and Income Inequality
Beta t-stat. Rule of Law Conflict Index Assassination(t-1) Other factors N R2
Defense Expenditures (DE)
Defense Exp./Total National Exp. Eq. (7) -0.073** -2.58 Yes Yes No Yes 1176 0.176
DE Eq. (10) -0.063** -2.22 Yes No No Yes 1177 0.145
DE Eq. (13) -0.070** -2.16 Yes Yes Yes Yes 864 0.211
DE Eq. (16) -0.060* -1.86 Yes No Yes Yes 865 0.185
Federalism
Federalism Index (FI) using Eq. (7) -0.061* -1.89 Yes Yes No Yes 1175 0.139
FI  Eq. (10) -0.062* -1.92 Yes No No Yes 1175 0.136
FI  Eq. (13) -0.079* -1.95 Yes Yes Yes Yes 860 0.143
FI  Eq. (16) -0.079* -1.96 Yes No Yes Yes 860 0.140
Lack of press freedom
Repressive actions (RA) using Eq. (7) 0.166*** 2.93 Yes Yes No Yes 1034 0.216
FI  Eq. (10) 0.183*** 3.12 Yes No No Yes 1034 0.192
FI  Eq. (13) 0.196*** 3.21 Yes Yes Yes Yes 740 0.308
FI  Eq. (16) 0.214*** 3.31 Yes No Yes Yes 740 0.278
Income inequality
GINI Coefficient using Eq. (7) 0.139*** 2.67 Yes Yes No Yes 853 0.180
GINI  Eq. (10) 0.139*** 2.66 Yes No No Yes 853 0.139
GINI Eq. (13) 0.015*** 2.71 Yes Yes Yes Yes 642 0.258
GINI  Eq. (16) 0.164*** 2.66 Yes No Yes Yes 642 0.250
Notes: Summary of 16 regressions. Estimations with robust standard errors. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4: 2SLS Estimations
Explanatory variables 2SLS First Stage
Regression
of Law and
Order
2SLS First Stage
Regression
of Law and
Order
2SLS First Stage
Regression
of Law and
Order
First Stage
Regression
of Conflict
Index
2SLS First Stage
Regression
of Law and
Order
First Stage
Regression
of Conflict
Index
  (22)  (23)   (24)    (25)  
Law and Order -0.194*** -0.190*** -0.164** -0.146***
(-4.53) (-4.90) (-3.87) (-3.56)
Conflict Index 0.4e-04*** 0.5e-04***
(2.60) (3.47)
Cabinet Size -0.009** 0.001 -0.015*** 0.003 -0.006 0.001 -43.680* -0.013** 0.003 -32.919
(-2.03) (0.46) (-3.03) 1.22 (-1.38) (0.30) (-1.96) (-2.54) (1.32) (-1.17)
log(population) 0.137*** -0.044*** 0.156*** -0.039*** 0.088*** -0.039** 896.963*** 0.096*** -0.029*** 712.678***
(6.39) (-2.81) (6.10) (-3.63) (3.15) (-2.42) (7.71) (3.15) (-2.62) (4.85)
Share Population >65 -0.0004 0.068*** 0.0004 0.016** 0.001 0.064*** -109.649 -0.001 0.017** -6.447
(-0.03) (7.01) (0.02) (2.19) (0.06) (6.67) (-1.58) (-0.04) (2.35) (-0.07)
Instruments
Law and Order(t-1) 0.577*** 0.902*** 0.592*** 36.718 0.897*** -439.633**
(31.95) (61.47) (31.94) 0.280 (61.26) (-2.24)
Annual Temperature -0.007** -0.007** -9.140
(-2.06) (-1.98) (-0.19)
Conflict Index(t-1) -4.7e-06 0.338*** -6.6e-06*** 0.401***
(-1.36) (13.54) (-2.98) (13.51)
Test of excluded 1021.10*** 1931.44*** 529.25*** 93.25*** 1333.45*** 67.42***
instruments
Identification/IV relevance test:
Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic 764.50*** 1470.43*** 175.97*** 166.72***
Weak identification statistics:
Anderson-Rubin test of joint
significance of endogenous regressors
20.39*** 23.83*** 25.32*** 37.68***
overidentification test of all  instr.:
Sargan statistic 0.964 0.082
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes   
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
# of observations 1278 841 1262   836  
Notes: Estimations without beta coefficients. t-statistics in parentheses, marginal effects in italics. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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APPENDIX
Table A1: Countries
Albania Guatemala Nigeria
Algeria Guinea Norway
Angola Guinea-Bissau Oman
Argentina Guyana Pakistan
Armenia Haiti Panama
Australia Honduras Papua New Guinea
Austria Hungary Paraguay
Azerbaijan Iceland Peru
Bahamas India Philippines
Bahrain Indonesia Poland
Bangladesh Iran Portugal
Belarus Iraq Qatar
Belgium Ireland Romania
Bolivia Israel Russian Federation
Botswana Italy Saudi Arabia
Brazil Jamaica Senegal
Bulgaria Japan Sierra Leone
Burkina Faso Jordan Singapore
Cameroon Kazakhstan Slovakia
Canada Kenya Slovenia
Chile North Korea Somalia
China South Korea Spain
Colombia Kuwait Sri Lanka
Congo, Republic of Latvia Sudan
Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Lebanon Suriname
Costa Rica Liberia Sweden
Cote D'Ivoire Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Switzerland
Croatia Lithuania Syrian Arab Republic
Cuba Luxembourg Tanzania, United Republic of
Cyprus Madagascar Thailand
Czech Republic Malawi Togo
Denmark Malaysia Trinidad and Tobago
Dominican Republic Mali Tunisia
Ecuador Malta Turkey
Egypt Mexico Uganda
El Salvador Moldova, Republic of Ukraine
Estonia Mongolia United Arab Emirates
Ethiopia Morocco United Kingdom
Finland Mozambique United States
France Myanmar Uruguay
Gabon Namibia Venezuela
Gambia Netherlands Viet Nam
Germany New Zealand Yemen
Ghana Nicaragua Zambia
Greece Niger Zimbabwe
Notes: Unbalanced panel. Countries based on specification (4) in Table 1.
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Table A2: Summary Statistics
Key Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
assassinations 3682 0.190 0.872 0 15
political accountability 2620 3.977 1.234 0.5 6.6
law and order 2620 3.646 1.545 0 6
political risk 2601 62.443 16.123 9.583 97
conflict index 3681 2587 6123 0 91125
cabinet size 3707 21.591 9.208 0 109
log(population) 3709 8.301 2.288 0 14.079
share population >65 3713 6.255 4.229 1.007 19.330
log(GDP per capita) 3442 7.495 1.551 4.035 10.751
defense expenditures a 1492 0.128 0.113 0 0.819
federalism index 1479 0.289 0.322 0 1
lack of press freedom 1487 3.094 4.085 0 20
income inequality 1136 37.088 10.547 16.63 73.90
Notes: a Some countries, such as Liechtenstein or Andorra, with no defense expenditures, do not
appear in the regressions due to the lack of control variables. (See also Table A1).
Figure A1: Assassinations Per Year (Mean)
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